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Abstract: I define two metaphysical positions that anti-physicalists 
can take in response to Jonathan Schaffer’s ground functionalism. 
Ground functionalism is a version of physicalism where explanatory 
gaps are everywhere. If ground functionalism is true, arguments 
against physicalism based on the explanatory gap between the 
physical and experiential facts fail. In response, first, I argue that 
some anti-physicalists are already safe from Schaffer’s challenge. 
These anti-physicalists reject an underlying assumption of ground 
functionalism: the assumption that macrophysical entities are 
something over and above the fundamental entities. I call their 
position “lightweight anti-physicalism.” Second, I go on to argue that 
even if anti-physicalists accept Schaffer’s underlying assumption, they 
can still argue that the consciousness explanatory gap is especially 
mysterious and thus requires a special explanation. I call the resulting 
position “heavyweight anti-physicalism.” In both cases, the 






1. Introduction  
 
The thesis that the knowledge of the cosmos’ fundamental facts would allow a powerful 
intellect to deduce all other facts is intuitively plausible. The success of physics 
indicates that the fundamental facts are physical. If so, a powerful intellect should, in 
principle, be able to deduce the facts of chemistry, biology, society, and even 
consciousness, from the fundamental physical facts. 
 
The above thesis presupposes an intelligible connection between fundamental reality 
and the rest of reality. In recent philosophical debates, Chalmers (2012) has 
influentially characterized such theses as scrutability theses. In scrutability theses, the 
intuitive notion of “intelligible connection” is rigorously defined as a priori 
entailment. I define the above thesis as a scrutability thesis, as follows: 
 
Cosmic Scrutability: The microphysical truths a priori entail all other 
truths.  
 
In this usage, P a priori entails Q iff the material conditional “if P then Q” is a priori 
knowable.1 Chalmers argues that a priori entailment, so construed, is apt to provide 
“transparent bottom-up explanation,” meaning that “once one has spelled out the 
lower-level facts […] there is no residual mystery about what the high-level facts are or 
about how the low-level facts give rise to them.” (2012, p. 305)  
 
The microphysical truths form the scrutability base of Cosmic Scrutability.2  The 
microphysical truths, as defined by Chalmers, are “truths about fundamental physical 
entities in the language of a completed fundamental physics” (2012, p. 110). 
 
Chalmers rejects Cosmic Scrutability. Chalmers (1996, 2010) and Jackson (1998) have 
argued that the paradigmatic case of the putative failure of Cosmic Scrutability is 
 
1 The role of “a priori” here is simply that, given the information in P and Q (even if these are obtained 
empirically) a sufficiently good reasoner needs no further information to know whether “if P then Q” 
is true.  
2 All scrutability theses posit a compact class of truths—a scrutability base—that a priori entails all the 
other truths.  
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consciousness.3 Consciousness is understood in terms of experience. The phenomenal 
truths are truths about experiences. The phenomenal truths involve phenomenal 
concepts, concepts that refer to experiences in terms of how they feel. Following Levine 
(1983), the putative failure of Cosmic Scrutability due to consciousness is standardly 
characterized as an explanatory gap. I refer to this explanatory gap as follows: 
 
Consciousness Gap: The physical truths do not a priori entail the 
phenomenal truths.  
 
Chalmers and Jackson have used Consciousness Gap to pose an epistemic challenge 
against physicalism. Physicalism, roughly defined, is the metaphysical thesis that all 
fundamental entities are physical. The main targets of the Consciousness Gap 
challenge are physicalists who believe in Cosmic Scrutability. Influential 20th century 
physicalists, such as Lewis and Armstrong, have defended versions of physicalism (so-
called “analytic functionalism”) that require Cosmic Scrutability. These are the type-
A physicalists, in Chalmers’ (1996) terminology. Unless type-A physicalists can find a 
way to make Cosmic Scrutability work, their version of physicalism must be false. In 
light of this, Levine has described Consciousness Gap as “the main obstacle to 
acceptance of materialism” (2001, p. 76). 
 
In response, many contemporary physicalists reject Cosmic Scrutability and accept 
Consciousness Gap. These are the type-B physicalists in Chalmers’ (1996) 
terminology. In terms of metaphysics, like all physicalists, type-B physicalists think 
the fundamental entities are exclusively physical. However, in terms of explanation, 
type-B physicalists do not think the microphysical truths must a priori entail 
phenomenal truths. Type-B physicalists typically embrace the phenomenal concepts 
strategy (PCS).4 According to PCS physicalists, Consciousness Gap obtains due to the 
special nature of phenomenal concepts. Thus, according to many PCS physicalists, 
although Cosmic Scrutability could be true in general, the special nature of 
phenomenal concepts explains why it fails in the case of consciousness. 
 
3 Chalmers and Jackson’s (2001) view is that the most likely candidate for a scrutability base is the 
conjunction of the microphysical truths (P), the phenomenal truths (Q), a totality “that’s all” premise 
(T), and the indexical truths (I): all together abbreviated as “PQTI.” 
4 PCS physicalists include Loar (1990), Balog (1999), and Papineau (2002), among others. 
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Schaffer (2017b, forthcoming) defends ground functionalism, a version of type-B 
physicalism where explanatory gaps are everywhere, in all instances of metaphysical 
dependence. Like other type-B physicalists, Schaffer accepts Consciousness Gap and 
rejects Cosmic Scrutability. However, unlike PCS physicalists, Schaffer is not 
concerned with the nature of phenomenal concepts. This is because he does not see 
Consciousness Gap as a special case. On the ground functionalism picture, there are 
explanatory gaps even in assumed paradigmatic cases of a priori entailment involving 
only physical truths; for example, between the truths of H+H+O atoms and H2O 
molecules. If so, Consciousness Gap is not special since no explanatory gap is special. 
Thus, if ground functionalism is true, Consciousness Gap based arguments against 
physicalism fail.  
 
Against Schaffer, in this paper, I defend the anti-physicalist use of Consciousness Gap. 
In Section 2, I contrast the commonly held thesis that explanatory gaps are sparse and 
special with Schaffer’s thesis that explanatory gaps are everywhere. In Section 3, I 
argue that some anti-physicalists are already safe from Schaffer’s challenge. These 
anti-physicalists reject Schaffer’s assumption that macrophysical entities are 
something over and above the fundamental entities.  Finally, in Section 4, I argue that 
one can accept Schaffer’s view of the macrophysical and still argue against physicalism 
based on Consciousness Gap. This is because Consciousness Gap is special, even if 
explanatory gaps are everywhere.  
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2. Explanatory Gaps: Sparse or Everywhere? 
 
2.1. Explanatory Gaps and Grounding  
 
Consciousness Gap is naturally read as involving grounding. Grounding, as I 
understand it, is a relation of metaphysical dependence between the more and the less 
fundamental entities or facts. All instances of grounding obtain between grounds: 
corresponding to the more fundamental facts, and groundees: corresponding to the 
less fundamental facts. The groundees metaphysically depend on the grounds. The 
fundamental facts are the ultimate grounds; they ground everything else yet are 
themselves ungrounded. The derivative facts are the non-fundamental facts; they are 
the facts that are grounded (either in other derivative facts or in the fundamental 
facts).5 If physicalism is true, the physical facts ground the phenomenal facts. 
 
There are ongoing debates in the literature about the properties (and even the salience) 
of grounding. What matters for my purposes here are only two relatively 
uncontroversial features of grounding understood in a coarse-grain way. First, 
grounding is a relation of directed dependence; it orders the metaphysical hierarchy 
from the fundamental grounds up. Second, grounding is synchronic. The dependence 
in cases of grounding happens at the same time (synchronically), unlike in cases of 
causation, where it might also happen across time (diachronically). 
 
Since all the relevant cases I intend to discuss involve grounding, in what follows, I 
restrict the notion of “explanatory gap” to grounding. 
 
Explanatory Gap: an explanatory gap obtains iff there is no a priori 




5 I base my characterization of grounding on the work of Fine (2001), Schaffer (2009), and Rosen 
(2010).  
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Conceivability is a perfect tool for locating explanatory gaps.6 A scenario is conceivable 
iff it is rationally coherent upon ideal rational reflection. 7  For a ground P and a 
groundee Q, if it is conceivable that P obtains while Q fails to obtain, then there is an 
explanatory gap between P and Q. Moreover, vice-versa, if there is an explanatory gap 
between P and Q, then it must be conceivable that P obtains while Q fails to obtain.  
 
2.2. Macrophysical Scrutability 
 
Even if Cosmic Scrutability fails,8 many philosophers are willing to accept a weaker, 
restricted scrutability thesis.9 The following such thesis is of particular importance to 
the philosophy of mind: 
  
Macrophysical Scrutability: the microphysical truths a priori entail 
all macrophysical truths. 
 
The most thorough defense of Macrophysical Scrutability in the recent literature 
comes from Chalmers and Jackson (2001) and Chalmers (1996, 2012). Chalmers 
defines the macrophysical truths as the “truths about any entities, including 
macroscopic entities, in the language of classical physics” (2012, p. 110). They involve 
“the structure and dynamics of the world at the macroscopic level, at least insofar as 
this structure and dynamics can be captured in terms of spatiotemporal structure 
(position, velocity, shape, etc.) and mass distribution” (Chalmers & Jackson, 2001, p. 
330). 
 
Macrophysical Scrutability is far more plausible than Cosmic Scrutability. 
Macrophysical Scrutability involves “only a change of scale” (Chalmers & Jackson, 
2001, p. 331) between physical truths. It entails that the physical structure and 
 
6 Both Chalmers (1996, 2010, 2012) and  Schaffer  (2017b, pp. 3–4) agree on this. 
7 Chalmers (2010) calls this notion of conceivability “ideal negative conceivability.” 
8 Presumably due to Consciousness Gap or another counter-example. For example, Block and 
Stalnaker (1999) have famously argued that Cosmic Scrutability fails since there seems to be no a 
priori entailment between the microphysical truths and pre-theoretical macroscopic truths. 
9 In Chalmers’ (2012, p. 39) terminology, a scrutability thesis is restricted iff its base a priori entail a 
limited class of other truths.  
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dynamics of the cosmos are intelligible at all scales in virtue of its fundamental 
physical building blocks.  
 
Macrophysical Scrutability is widely accepted (explicitly or implicitly) by both anti-
physicalists and physicalists. Chalmers (1996, 2012), Chalmers and Jackson (2001),  
and Goff (2017) defend Macrophysical Scrutability, while Balog (1999), Levine 
(2001), McLaughlin (2019), McQueen (2015), and Papineau (2002), amongst others, 
are sympathetic towards it. For example, McQueen argues that the truth of mass 
additivity is a priori entailed by the principles of Newtonian microphysics, while 
arguably by the principles of special relativity, “with enough relativistic information 
one could deduce that something has non-additive mass.” (2015, p. 1388) Moreover, 
McLaughlin (2019) argues that there is a priori entailment from the truths of quantum 
mechanics to the truths of chemistry. Finally, according to Balog (1999, p. 523), the “A 
Priori Entailment Thesis” (which roughly translates to Cosmic Scrutability), “might 
be correct about all truths except phenomenal truths.” 
 
My view is that Macrophysical Scrutability is indispensable for the success of 
arguments against physicalism based on Consciousness Gap. Here, I have in mind the 
three “epistemic arguments” against physicalism: the explanatory argument, the 
knowledge argument, and the conceivability argument. Consciousness Gap (expressed 
either in terms of explanation, knowledge, or conceivability) features as an epistemic 
premise in all three of these arguments.10 I argue that, although it is not explicitly 
stated, Macrophysical Scrutability likewise features in the background of these 
arguments as an implicit assumption.  
 
Consciousness Gap alone—as an epistemic premise—is impotent against physicalism 
as a metaphysical thesis. This is why all three of the above epistemic arguments 
contain a further premise that links epistemology to metaphysics. I refer to this 
premise as “Link.”  
 
Link: explanatory gaps entail metaphysical possibilities. 
 
 
10 See Chalmers (2003, pp. 107–108). 
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All proponents of the epistemic arguments against physicalism accept some form of 
Link. Typically, they defend more nuanced or restricted forms of Link instead of the 
above baseline form. 11  What matters for my purposes is that Consciousness Gap, via 
some form of Link, is taken to entail that physicalism is false. The above baseline form 
of Link is the foundation for all the other more nuanced forms, and thus, I focus on it 
here.  
 
I argue that Macrophysical Scrutability justifies Link. Macrophysical Scrutability 
applies ubiquitously throughout the cosmos. It provides a clear example of a 
ubiquitous class of grounding connections without explanatory gaps. Thus, 
Macrophysical Scrutability proves that explanatory gaps are not everywhere. Instead, 
it appears that as a general rule, for true grounding claims, grounds a priori entail 
groundees throughout the cosmos. If so, Macrophysical Scrutability justifies the 
following thesis: 
 
No Gaps: as a general rule, there are no explanatory gaps between the 
grounds and groundees referenced in true grounding claims.   
 
No Gaps entails that explanatory gaps are a good guide to locating false grounding 
claims. No Gaps entails that, as a general rule, for any explanatory gap involving a 
ground P and a groundee Q, the corresponding grounding claim might be false. Thus, 
it is metaphysically possible that P does not ground Q. If so, some form of Link must 
be true.  
 
Putting the chain of inference together: Macrophysical Scrutability justifies No Gaps, 
while No Gaps justifies Link. Thus, via No Gaps, Macrophysical Scrutability justifies 
Link. Although roughly stated, this chain of inference demonstrates a clear connection 
between Macrophysical Scrutability and Link. I believe that something analogous to 




11 See Chalmers (2010) and Goff (2017, p. 100) for two recent versions of Link. 
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In summary: the orthodox view in the philosophy of mind is that explanatory gaps are 
sparse and special. They are standardly seen as an odd exception to an otherwise 
intelligible universe, and as such, need to be addressed. As I have argued, this stance 
is expressed in Link and is based on the implicit acceptance of Macrophysical 
Scrutability. Consciousness Gap entails the falsity of physicalism only via Link. 
However, without Macrophysical Scrutability, Link is ad hoc and implausible. If this 
is correct, Macrophysical Scrutability is indispensable for the success of the epistemic 
arguments against physicalism. 
 
2.3. Schaffer’s Mereological Gap 
 
Schaffer (2017b, forthcoming) argues for ground functionalism, a version of 
physicalism where explanatory gaps are everywhere. If ground functionalism is true, 
there are explanatory gaps between all concrete grounds and groundees (2017b, p. 10). 
Schaffer accepts Consciousness Gap but rejects both Cosmic Scrutability and 
Macrophysical Scrutability. If ground functionalism is true, for all concrete grounds 
and groundees, explanatory gaps are always the rule, and there are no exceptions.  
 
Schaffer offers his most elaborate defense of ground functionalism in “The Ground 
Between the Gaps” (2017b). There, he argues that explanatory gaps are everywhere 
because it is “conceivable, logically possible, and not a priori knowable otherwise that 
there are no derivative entities” [emphasis mine] (2017b, p. 14). Following Bennett 
(2011), Schaffer illustrates this with the conceivability of a flat-world. 
 
To conceive of a flat-world, we need to conceive a scenario in which the fundamental 
physical facts obtain, yet no concrete groundees obtain. The flat-world is a world where 
only fundamental entities exist, and there are no concrete derivative entities. Thus, in 
the flat-world, there would be fundamental physical entities, but there would be no 
atoms, molecules, living organisms, societies, and so on—grounded in them.  
 
Our world is conceivably a flat-world. The flat-world is a perfect microphysical copy of 
our world. Thus, it is observationally indistinguishable from our world (2017b, p. 9). 
Thus, the flat-world is not a world where the cosmos is empty, nor where there is some 
sort of quantum mush everywhere. Rather, the key difference between the flat-world 
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and worlds with derivative entities is the number of entities. To use a metaphor, if God 
is running an inventory of what exists, the inventory would have fewer items in the 
flat-world than in worlds with derivative entities. 
 
Schaffer’s flagship example involves mereological composition. Following van 
Inwagen (1990), there is an ongoing debate in the metaphysics literature regarding 
when, and if at all, parts compose a further entity. Roughly, that is van Inwagen’s 
“special composition question.” Mereological nihilism, i.e., the thesis that parts never 
compose anything, is true in the flat-world. The flat-world’s conceivability 
demonstrates that the special composition question cannot be answered a priori in 
virtue of conceptual information about the natures of microphysical and 
macrophysical entities alone. In Schaffer’s own words: 
I am saying that an ideal mind, given the empirical information that 
there are H, H, and O atoms in a given arrangement, and given the 
conceptual information that an H2O molecule is an individual 
composed in a given way and with a given nature, still needs more 
information to determine whether an H2O molecule is present. [...] 
She needs substantive metaphysical information about the principles 
of composition. (2017b, p. 10) 
 
Before proceeding, it is important to note that, in the example above, “H, H, and O” 
must stand for two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom after they have formed 
molecular bonds, and not for individual “free-floating” atoms without molecular 
bonds. Moreover, the H, H, and O atoms and the H2O molecule must exist at the same 
time and place. All this is entailed by grounding being a synchronic relation. 
Analogous considerations apply to all other composites and their grounds. Thus, for 
clarity, in contrast to Schaffer, instead of “H, H, and O,” henceforth, I use the label 
“H+H+O” as a placeholder term for the microphysical ground of H2O.12 
 
 
12 Atoms are not fundamental entities; nevertheless, I speak of them as such for convenience. 
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Schaffer argues that the non-trivial nature of the special composition question results 
in a ubiquitous explanatory gap. I formulate this explanatory gap as follows: 13 
 
Mereological Gap: the microphysical truths do not a priori entail the 
existence truths of macrophysical entities. 
 
Mereological Gap entails that: “explanatory gaps are everywhere in nature, lurking in 
every concrete transition from more to less fundamental” (2017b, p. 14). Schaffer’s 
solution for closing these abundant explanatory gaps is that “grounding bridges gaps.” 
(2017b, p. 2) The idea behind this slogan is that there is a need for “substantive 
grounding principles” (2017b, p. 14) connecting grounds and groundees. The 
grounding principles are posited abductively, “by inference to the best explanation, in 
a holistic and fallible manner” (forthcoming). They explain how a specific ground 
determines a specific groundee.  
 
Mereological Gap seems to contradict Macrophysical Scrutability. Schaffer uses 
Mereological Gap to argue that all forms of Link are false, that explanatory gaps alone 
never entail metaphysical possibilities. Schaffer’s ground functionalism posits that 
possibility is always determined by the grounding principles in conjunction with the 
grounds. If ground functionalism is true, conceivability never entails possibility 
without the inclusion of the grounding principles. Thus, if ground functionalism is 
true, all scrutability theses whose bases consist solely of truths about the fundamental 
entities are false. If so, both Cosmic Scrutability and Macrophysical Scrutability are 
false. The only scrutability thesis that Schaffer accepts includes the grounding 
principles in the scrutability base alongside the microphysical truths.14  
 
13 Schaffer (2017b, pp. 13–14) also posits the conceivability of a ghost-world where all derivative 
entities are epiphenomenal. This is expected to show that the natures of composites are not a priori 
scrutable from the microphysical truths. Everything I say here about existence—mutatis mutandis—
applies to the case of nature. 
14 Schaffer’s (2017b, pp. 18–19) view is that the most likely candidate is a “PTIG” scrutability base, 
namely the conjunction of the microphysical truths (P), a totality “that’s all” premise (T), the indexical 
truths (I), and the grounding principles (G). 
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3. Lightweight Anti-Physicalism 
 
3.1. Opposing Worldviews 
 
We have reached an impasse between opposing worldviews at this point in the 
discussion. On the one hand, in the philosophy of mind debates, Macrophysical 
Scrutability appears to be broadly accepted by both anti-physicalists and physicalists. 
According to friends of Macrophysical Scrutability, the H+H+O truths a priori entail 
the H2O truths. On the other hand, metaphysicians who have dealt with the special 
composition question and think mereological nihilism is conceivable might agree with 
Schaffer that Mereological Gap is true. In their view, the H+H+O truths do not a priori 
entail the H2O truths.  
 
Macrophysical Scrutability and Mereological Gap seem to contradict each other. The 
clash over Macrophysical Scrutability and Mereological Gap is of crucial importance 
to the philosophy of mind. Macrophysical Scrutability and Mereological Gap both 
involve truths about macrophysical entities. Yet, Macrophysical Scrutability justifies 
Link, while Mereological Gap seems to undermine Link.  
 
In the rest of this section, I offer a diagnosis of the dispute. Before proceeding, consider 
the following two epistemic theses as generalizations of the positions in the dispute:15 
 
Lightweightism: For some true grounding claims referencing 
concrete entities as grounds and groundees, the grounds a priori 
entail their groundees. 
 
Heavyweightism: For all true grounding claims referencing concrete 




15 These two epistemic these are roughly based on Chalmers’ (2012, pp. 267–271) classification of 
ontological views. 
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Ground functionalism is a version of Heavyweightism. In contrast, anti-physicalists 
like Chalmers and Goff (henceforth, I restrict the label “friends of Macrophysical 
Scrutability” to their views) embrace a form of Lightweightism. 
 
3.2. Strong and Weak Groundees 
 
Why do friends of Macrophysical Scrutability say they cannot conceive of H+H+O 
without H2O, while Schaffer says he can? I argue that this epistemic disagreement has 
a likely metaphysical explanation. My proposed diagnosis is that the disagreement 
arises because the two sides conceive of two different kinds of macrophysical entities. 
As I will show, Schaffer, on the one hand, conceives of macrophysical entities that are 
something over and above their grounds. Friends of Macrophysical Scrutability, on 
the other hand, conceive of macrophysical entities that are nothing over and above 
their grounds.  
 
First, throughout his career, Schaffer has consistently defended a “robust realism for 
the non-fundamental” (2017a, p. 2459). He takes “entities like tables to be full-blown 
‘heavyweight’ entities on the roster of entities” (2009, p. 360). In his view, both the 
fundamental and the derivative entities exist “equally, in the one and only sense of 
‘exist’” (2017a, p. 2458). 16  This is why, Schaffer argues, his framework does not 
ontologically privilege the fundamental over the derivative (2017a, pp. 2457–2458). 
His reference to H2O as a “further individual” (2017b, p. 23) is a testament to this. 
 
Derivative entities, as conceived by Schaffer, contain genuinely new information about 
reality. As Schaffer puts it: “I agree [with the anti-physicalist] that the phenomenal 
information is extra information. My point is that the same holds for all other higher-
level information” (2017b, p. 18). I take the presence of such “extra information” 
together with Schaffer’s views on existence to indicate that, for Schaffer, the derivative 
entities are something over and above their grounds. I refer to derivative entities 
conceived as such as “strong-groundees.”  
 
 
16 Also see Schaffer (2009, p. 360). 
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Strong-groundees: An entity E is a strong-groundee iff (i) E is 
derivative, and (ii) E is something over and above its ground. 
 
Although somewhat rough, “something over and above” is, I believe, sufficient to give 
an intuitive grasp of strong-groundees.17 It indicates a sense in which the existence of 
strong-groundees is not fully contained in the existence of their grounds. 
 
My attribution of strong-groundees to Schaffer might seem in tension with his further 
claim that derivative entities are an ontological “free lunch” (2009, p. 353). I believe 
this tension is only apparent. Schaffer clearly states that all he means by “free lunch” 
is that the derivative entities are not fundamental (2009, p. 353). His “free lunch” 
characterization is about ontological economy. As he puts it: “derivative entities [...] 
are genuinely new and distinct entities but they cost nothing by the measure of 
economy” (2015, p. 647).18 The “measure of economy” Schaffer has in mind is that the 
fundamental entities explain the derivative entities but not vice-versa.  
 
Second, Chalmers (1996), in contrast to Schaffer, argues that the derivative facts 
logically supervene on the fundamental facts.19  In cases of logical supervenience, 
given some more fundamental A-facts and some less fundamental B-facts: “all there 
is to the B-facts being as they are is that the A-facts are as they are” (1996, p. 36). 
Chalmers argues that the derivative facts are redescriptions of the fundamental facts. 
It seems that, in Chalmers’ view, insofar as the derivative entities exist, they exist only 
in a nominal way.20 Using the biological facts as an example, he says:  
Once God (hypothetically) made sure that all the physical facts in our 
world held, the biological facts came along for free. The B-facts merely 
redescribe what is described by the A-facts. They may be different 
facts (a fact about elephants is not a microphysical fact), but they are 
not further facts. (1996, p. 41) 
 
17 A rigorous definition of “something over and above” is beyond the scope of this paper. 
18 Schaffer (2015, p. 647) defends an ontological principle he calls the “Laser” (as opposed to 
Ockham’s “Razor”). The Laser states: “Do not multiply fundamental entities without necessity!”.  
19 Note, this was before the grounding revolution in metaphysics. Nevertheless, there are clear 
parallels to be drawn between Chalmers’ (1996) logical supervenience and grounding.  
20 Also see Chalmers (2009, p. 120). 
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Finally, Goff (2017 Ch. 2.2), similarly to Chalmers, argues that the macrophysical 
entities are grounded by analysis in the microphysical entities. In cases of grounding 
by analysis: “the grounding fact provides all that is essentially required for the entities 
contained in the grounded fact to be part of reality” (2017, p. 45). An entity grounded 
by analysis is “nothing over and above its ground” (2017, p. 42). Using “party” as an 
illustrative example, Goff  says: 
It’s not as though there are the people dancing, drinking, and so on, 
and then there’s this extra thing—the party—that floats above their 
heads. There’s a very intuitive sense in which the fact that there is a 
party is nothing more than the fact that there are people revelling; a 
world in which there are people revelling is already thereby a world 
in which there is a party. (2017, pp. 42–43) 
 
Chalmers and Goff, despite their differences, seem to reject the strong-groundee 
conception for macrophysical entities. Both Chalmers and Goff seem to agree that 
macrophysical entities contain no new information about reality. Thus, contra 
Schaffer, in both Chalmers’ and Goff’s views, there is a sense in which H2O and, in 
general, macrophysical entities are nothing over and above their grounds. I refer to 
derivative entities conceived in this way as “weak-groundees.” 
 
Weak-groundees: An entity E is a weak-groundee iff (i) E is derivative, 
and (ii) E is nothing over and above its ground. 
 
Again, “nothing over and above” talk is somewhat rough. Still, I find it is sufficient to 
give an intuitive grasp of weak-groundees. 21 It indicates a sense in which the existence 
of weak-groundees is fully contained in the existence of their grounds. 
 
My analysis suggests the following. Schaffer thinks all groundees are strong-
groundees. Chalmers and Goff think all macrophysical groundees are weak-
groundees. Neither side offers an explicit argument for their preferred groundee 
 
21 Again, as with “something over and above,” a rigorous definition of “nothing over and above” is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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theory. Regardless of who is right, this indicates two kinds of macrophysical entities at 
play in the dispute: strong-groundees and weak-groundees. If so, “H2O” can refer to 
either Strong-H2O (a strong-groundee) or Weak-H2O (a weak-groundee) (see Table 1). 
 
 Ground Groundee Explanatory Gap? 
Schaffer H+H+O Strong-H2O Yes 
Chalmers and Goff H+H+O Weak-H2O No 
Table 1: The explanatory gap between H+H+O and Strong-H2O. 
 
The results in Table 1 make sense, given how I defined strong-groundees and weak-
groundees.  
 
Strong-groundees are something over and above their grounds. Thus, plausibly, 
knowing whether they exist (and what their essential natures are) involves new 
information, beyond the information in their grounds. If so, it is reasonable to assume 
that—even given full information about ground and groundee—the existence of 
strong-groundees might not be a priori scrutable from their grounds.  
 
Weak-groundees are nothing over and above their grounds. Thus, plausibly, knowing 
whether they exist (and what their essential natures are) only involves learning the 
information in their grounds. If so, it is reasonable to assume that—at least when given 
full information about ground and groundee—the existence of weak-groundees might 
be a priori scrutable from their grounds. 
 
The above suggests a plausible explanation of the dispute: Mereological Gap 
presupposes strong-groundees, while Macrophysical Scrutability presupposes weak-
groundees. If so, Mereological Gap and Macrophysical Scrutability do not contradict 
each other; instead, they involve different kinds of entities in the roles of groundees. 
Mereological Gap, if true, shows that the existence of Strong-H2O (as a groundee) does 
not analytically follow from the existence of H+H+O (as a ground). In contrast, if true, 
Macrophysical Scrutability shows that the existence of Weak-H2O (as a groundee) 
analytically follows from the existence of H+H+O (as a ground). 
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Going back to the flat-world. My analysis indicates that what is missing from the flat-
world are the strong-groundees but not the weak groundees. Remember, the flat-world 
is observationally indistinguishable from worlds with groundees. If so, it seems, 
although it might be conceivable that Strong-H2O fails to exist in the flat-world, it is 
inconceivable that Weak-H2O would fail to exist. 
 
The difference between strong-groundees and weak-groundees suggests that strong-
groundees are an underlying assumption of ground functionalism that friends of 
Macrophysical Scrutability reject (in the macrophysical domain). If so, it explains 
why explanatory gaps are everywhere in the ground functionalism picture while sparse 
in the Macrophysical Scrutability picture.  
 
I do not take a hard stance in this dispute. What matters for my purpose is only that, 
as the above suggests: Mereological Gap requires strong-groundees, while 
Macrophysical Scrutability requires weak-groundees. I take this to entail that if all 
macrophysical groundees are weak-groundees—as Chalmers and Goff seem to think—
neither Mereological Gap nor ground functionalism would get off the ground. 
 
In summary: Chalmers and Goff assume that macrophysical entities are weak-
groundees. This assumption protects their positions from Shaffer’s Mereological Gap 
and allows them to use standard Consciousness Gap arguments against physicalism. 
Moreover, it makes their positions forms of Lightweightism. Thus, I classify their 
views as forms of “lightweight anti-physicalism,” where I take the qualifier 
“lightweight” to refer to macrophysical weak-groundees. Formally, I define this 
position as follows. 
 
Lightweight Anti-Physicalism: (i) All macrophysical entities are 
weak-groundees; (ii) For all true grounding claims referencing 
grounds and weak-groundees, given full and unambiguous 
information about ground and groundee, the grounds a priori entail 
their weak-groundees; (iii) The fundamental grounds are not entirely 




3.3. Schaffer’s Response 
 
Schaffer (2017b, pp. 21–24) anticipates his opponents might think that embracing 
Lightweightism would help them secure the specialness of Consciousness Gap. In 
response, Schaffer argues that this strategy cannot succeed. Roughly, he argues that if 
Lightweightism were true, it should apply equally to all instances of grounding. Thus, 
if friends of Lightweightism think Macrophysical Scrutability is true, they should also 
think that there is no gap between the microphysical and the phenomenal truths. In 
other words, Schaffer seems to be saying that a commitment to Lightweightism entails 
both that Consciousness Gap is false and that Cosmic Scrutability is true. In his own 
words: 
For if it can be “just by meanings” that the H, H, and O atoms compose 
something miscible, it can equally be “just by meanings” that these 
neurons and synapses compose someone miserable. Or at least, no 
relevant difference between the chemical and the phenomenal has 
been identified that keeps the latter specially out of reach of this 
stretched out notion of the analytic.  (2017b, p. 23) 
He concludes, “It is hard to be a dualist if analytic connections are so easy!” (2017b, p. 
23) 
 
According to Schaffer, friends of Lightweightism cannot explain why there is an 
explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal (and nowhere else) without 
falling into circular thinking. As he puts it: “Why is this connection specially opaque? 
Because there is no analytic connection. Why is there no analytic connection? Because 
the connection is specially opaque.” (2017b, p. 24) 
 
I think that Schaffer, in his argument above, is begging the question against 
Lightweight Anti-Physicalism. This is because Lightweight Anti-Physicalism does not 
entail that anything goes, that there are no explanatory gaps whatsoever. Schaffer fails 
to take notice of the qualifications that define Lightweight Anti-Physicalism. 
 
Firstly, all friends of Lightweight Anti-Physicalism agree that for a grounding claim 
to be without an explanatory gap, the grounding claim must be true. No friend of 
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Lightweight Anti-Physicalism would expect the truths of H+H+O atoms to a priori 
entail the truths of wombats. Why would they when this grounding claim is evidently 
false? Secondly, Lightweight Anti-Physicalism entails that, even for true grounding 
claims, the ground a priori entails the groundee iff the groundee is a weak-groundee. 
Schaffer, in his arguments above, takes none of these qualifications into consideration.  
 
I suggest Schaffer begs the question by presupposing (a) that consciousness is 
grounded in the physical entities and (b) that consciousness is a weak-groundee. In 
other words, Schaffer (in this argument) appears to presuppose that some lightweight 
version of physicalism is true. If this were the case, then yes, Schafer’s argument would 
be sound. However, this is precisely what friends of Lightweight Anti-Physicalism 
want to deny. Friends of Lightweight Anti-Physicalism agree that there are 
correlations between physical states and human consciousness. However, they do not 
start with the further assumptions that consciousness has a physical ground and that 
consciousness is a weak-groundee. Instead, they use Consciousness Gap and 
Macrophysical Scrutability to point out that physicalists are wrong to believe at least 
one of these claims. There is no circularity in thinking that Consciousness Gap obtains 
because consciousness is not grounded in the physical or because consciousness is not 
a weak-groundee.  
 
In summary, both sides accept Consciousness Gap. Chalmers and Goff presuppose 
weak-groundees and defend Lightweight Anti-Physicalism. Schaffer presupposes 
strong-groundees and defends ground functionalism. This brings us to a stalemate. 
Schaffer aspires to resolve the stalemate with his argument above. Yet, as I have 
argued, he seems to be begging the question against Lightweight Anti-Physicalism. 
He offers no non-question begging reason to doubt Consciousness Gap, were 
Lightweightism true. Thus, to decisively refute Lightweight Anti-Physicalism, the 
onus is on Schaffer to give a further argument against the weak-groundee conception, 
as employed by Chalmers and Goff. 
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4. Heavyweight Anti-Physicalism 
 
4.1. Beyond Lightweightism 
 
So far, I have argued that anti-physicalists could reasonably reject Mereological Gap 
by embracing Lightweight Anti-Physicalism. However, despite this, I still have not 
fully defused Schaffer’s challenge. So construed, being an anti-physicalist seems to 
hinge on the success of Lightweight Anti-Physicalism. Therefore, if Schaffer is right, 
explanatory gap arguments cannot work on a heavyweight view, such as ground 
functionalism.  
 
The above is problematic since it entails that one can be an anti-physicalist iff 
Lightweight Anti-Physicalism is true. Although versions of Lightweightism seem to 
be often assumed in the philosophy of mind, many contemporary metaphysicians 
favor Heavyweightism. Ground functionalism seems like the best attempt yet at 
creating a heavyweight version of physicalism. Thus, suppose Schaffer is right, and we 
need to conceive of H2O and derivative entities in general as strong-groundees. As 
Schaffer (2017b, pp. 22–23) anticipates, the physicalist can simply embrace ground 
functionalism or another version of Heavyweightism.22 
 
I think there is no reason to restrict anti-physicalism to Lightweight Anti-Physicalism. 
It is plausible that some anti-physicalists could be sympathetic towards 
Heavyweightism and think Mereological Gap is true, although they do not agree with 
Schaffer’s physicalism. Such anti-physicalists would be happy to bite the bullet of 
Mereological Gap and embrace the following view:  
 
Heavyweight Anti-Physicalism: (i) All concrete groundees are 
strong-groundees; (ii) For all true grounding claims referencing 
grounds and strong-groundees, the grounds never a priori entail their 
 
22 It is an additional problem, that is beyond the scope of this paper, whether physicalists would be 
motivated to embrace ground functionalism. Ground functionalism seems to be a close cousin (if not a 
version) of emergentism or naturalistic dualism. Thus, it might appear too dualistic for most 
physicalists.  
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strong-groundees; (iii) The fundamental grounds are not entirely 
physical. 
 
Friends of Heavyweight Anti-Physicalism can argue against physicalism either (a) 
without recourse to Consciousness Gap, or (b) with recourse to Consciousness Gap, by 
saying that Consciousness Gap is special in heavyweight views. 
 
Arguing against physicalism without recourse to Consciousness Gap means giving up 
one of the primary motivations for being an anti-physicalist. At least since Descartes, 
anti-physicalism has been fueled by the puzzlement of how consciousness can be 
physical or can exist in virtue of something physical. Moreover, giving up on 
Consciousness Gap being true would mean giving up many argumentative advances 
made by anti-physicalists, especially in discussions of phenomenal concepts. Thus, 
although it might be possible to argue for Heavyweight Anti-Physicalism without 
recourse to Consciousness Gap being true, that is certainly undermotivated and 
disadvantageous.  
 
Alternatively, friends of Heavyweight Anti-Physicalism can say that Consciousness 
Gap is special, even on heavyweight views. The mysteriousness of consciousness does 
not seem to diminish if Mereological Gap is true. Consciousness Gap based arguments 
against physicalism are the best articulation of this puzzlement. In what follows, I will 
show how to argue for Heavyweight Anti-Physicalism, based on Consciousness Gap. 
 
4.2. The Deep Opacity Argument 
 
Schaffer argues that if ground functionalism is true, Consciousness Gap is not special. 
Against Schaffer, I argue that Consciousness Gap is significantly more mysterious than 
Mereological Gap, and thus, demands an explanation. I call this argument “the deep 
opacity argument”: 
 
P-1. Deeply Opaque: Consciousness Gap is deeply opaque. 
P-2. Explanation: Deeply opaque explanatory gaps require an explanation of their 
deep opacity. 
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C.  Consciousness Gap requires an explanation of its deep opacity. 
 
The deep opacity argument is valid and simple. Nevertheless, both P-1 and P-2 need 
further clarification and justification. 
 
4.3. P-1: Deeply Opaque 
 
First, P-1: Deeply Opaque. Against Schaffer, I argue that even if we accept 
Heavyweightism, not all grounding connections are equally opaque. Even if 
explanatory gaps are everywhere, some explanatory gaps are more mysterious than 
others and thus deeply opaque.  
 
Deep Opacity: For any ground P and strong-groundee Q, the claim 
that P grounds Q exhibits a deeply opaque explanatory gap iff (i) P 
and Q are conceived under transparent concepts, and (ii) a priori 
reflection on Q does not reveal P’s essence. 
 
A few clarificatory remarks are in order.  
 
First, Deep Opacity is theory-specific. Unless otherwise specified, I assume ground 
functionalism to be the metaphysical theory under consideration.  
 
Second, Deep Opacity requires transparent concepts. I understand “transparent 
concepts” in the same way Goff (2017, p. 91) does, as concepts that reveal the full 
essence of their referents. 23  Like Goff, I assume that phenomenal and pure physical 
concepts are transparent.24  
 
The requirement for transparent concepts might seem overly high. After all, most 
ordinary language concepts are not transparent. For example, it is plain that water, 
when conceived as the watery stuff that fills the oceans and quenches our thirst, does 
 
23 Transparent concepts can also serve as a more rigorous characterization of the “full and 
unambiguous information” notion in Lightweight Anti-Physicalism. 
24 It is worth noting that Goff (2017, p. 141) does not think that “impure” physical concepts (e.g., the 
physical concepts used in a Russellian monist framework) are transparent. 
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not a priori reveal anything about H2O, its physical essence. The same seems true for 
most macroscopic phenomena. I agree with this observation. However, as Goff (2017, 
p. 99) acknowledges, the lack of transparency in ordinary language is plausibly due to 
human ignorance.  
 
Deep Opacity seeks to find deeply opaque connections between the entities themselves 
and not merely between the concepts we use. Only transparent concepts can provide 
the ontological clarity needed for this task. Luckily, it is reasonable to assume that, in 
principle, all concepts have a transparent version. If so, non-transparent propositions 
are, in principle, convertible to transparent propositions with the same meaning. Goff 
(2017, p. 130) dubs this process “transparent rendering.” Transparent rendering 
replaces every non-transparent concept in a given proposition with its transparent, co-
referring counterpart. For example, in this process, the non-transparent concept 
“water” would be replaced with the transparent concept “H2O.”  
 
The above allows Deep Opacity to, in principle, evaluate any grounding connection 
posited by a heavyweight metaphysical theory while avoiding false positives due to 
ignorance or ambiguity. 
 
Third, Deep Opacity involves a top-down analysis of grounding connections. It starts 
with the groundee and moves to the ground. This approach is tailor-made for 
heavyweight views. Remember, if Heavyweightism is true, groundees are always 
something over and above their grounds. Thus, in this context, it is natural to analyze 
a grounding connection’s opacity by analyzing just how much of the ground’s essence 
is contained within the groundee’s essence. 
 
Finally, Deep Opacity scans the groundee for the essence of its ground. Following the 
current orthodoxy, I take essences to be real definitions. Henceforth, for ease of 
discussion, I will always speak of the ground as a kind. This is because groundees are 
typically multiply realizable. Thus, in most cases, the ground (considered as a kind) is 
a possibly infinite collection of facts or entities. The items in this collection are the 
ground’s instances. As I will now explain, when discussing the essence of a ground, I 




I take the essence of a ground to be a condition that must be satisfied by all instances 
of that ground.25, 26 Quite plausibly, all instances of a ground have some properties in 
virtue of which they serve as that ground. These properties seem to be the ones that 
metaphysically explain the groundee. Whether an instance has other properties 
beyond these seems to make no difference to the groundee. For example, assume that 
the fact “there are animals” is grounded in the fact “there are humans, cats, and 
sparrows.” Only the properties that make humans, cats, and sparrows into animals 
seem to do explanatory work. Whether humans are moreover rational plays no role in 
metaphysically explaining  “there are animals.” Thus, I take the essence of the ground 
to be a condition specifying the properties that something must have to metaphysically 
explain the groundee, and hence, count as an instance of that ground. This holds true 
even in cases where the ground has only one instance. 
 
All explanatory gaps involve a failure of a priori entailment. However, only some 
explanatory gaps involve grounds and groundees with vastly different essences. These 
“deeply opaque” gaps are categorically more opaque than the other gaps. This will 
become clear as I put Deep Opacity to use. 
 
I claim that Consciousness Gap is deeply opaque because, a priori, experiences (as 
groundees) fail to reveal the essences of their microphysical grounds. A priori, 
experiences are essentially what they feel like. Their essences appear fully constituted 
by their phenomenal characters. For example, a priori, the essence of pain is that pain 
hurts. In contrast, the microphysical ground of any experience is likely a collection of 
microphysical states exhibiting some specific (and yet undiscovered) structure. 
Plausibly, the ground’s essence is a description of that structure. Experiences, I claim, 
fail to a priori reveal this structure. This difference in essences gives rise to 
Consciousness Gap’s deep opacity. 
 
 
25 And likely a proviso that all the items in the ground are more fundamental than the groundee. This 
follows trivially from the nature of “ground.” 
26 Fine (2012, pp. 74–76) defends a very similar claim. Also see Dasgupta (2014) and Goff (2017, 
Chapter 2.2) for similar essence-based accounts of grounding. 
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It could be objected that some experiences exhibit the same structures as their physical 
grounds. On a naïve reading, this claim is almost certainly false. Current neuroscience 
indicates that experiential structures are not direct copies of brain structures. Simply 
put: my experience of a triangle is almost certainly not grounded in an actual triangle 
in the brain.  
 
A more promising reading of the above claim is that some experiences and their 
grounds instantiate the same information structures.27 But, again, I am skeptical this 
can dispel Consciousness Gap’s deep opacity. 
 
If we understand “information” in a broad sense,28 information structures are too 
common to define the ground of consciousness. When broadly construed, information 
is everywhere: in all systems and at all scales. A doorknob might have the same 
information structure as many simple experiences. Yet, it is highly unlikely that 
doorknobs ground experiences.  
 
If, on the other hand, we employ a more narrow sense of “information,” then almost 
certainly, such information structures are not a priori revealed by experiences. For 
example, in neuroscience, the Integrated Information Theory posits that experiences 
are identical to the system’s maximal Φ, i.e., the “maximally irreducible cause-effect 
structure associated with the system in that state” (Koch, 2019, p. 87). However, as 
things stand now, it seems impossible to discover such nuanced structures in the 
substratum purely based on introspection.  
 
Relatedly, it might be objected that some experiences are essentially bodily. For 
example, it might be a priori that pain presents itself as something that hurts the body. 
Nevertheless, although pain might represent the body, this is insufficient to reveal the 
essence of pain’s physical ground. As far as a priori reflection of pain goes, the body 
might be made of ectoplasm or have any odd structure. Thus, again, I do not think this 
removes Consciousness Gap’s deep opacity.  
 
 
27 See Chalmers (1996, Chapter 8). 
28 For example, “information” in Claude Shannon’s sense. 
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In contrast, Mereological Gap is not deeply opaque because, a priori, each composite 
(as a groundee) seems to reveal the essence of its microphysical ground. Consider 
Strong-H2O and H+H+O once again. By definition, Strong-H2O is a molecule 
grounded in H+H+O. On the other hand, H+H+O’s essence is likely a description of 
the H, H, and O atoms and their bonds. If so, given that essences are real definitions, 
Strong-H2O’s essence clearly references its ground. It seems impossible to imagine 
what else—if not H+H+O—could make Strong-H2O a molecule. This point is further 
backed by the fact that H+H+O and Strong-H2O are observably indistinguishable. 
Thus, fully describing either of them is impossible without describing the H, H, and O 
atoms and their bonds.  
 
Putting this together: Strong-H2O is something over and above H+H+O; yet, its 
essence must reference H+H+O. This point holds even if Strong-H2O is 
epiphenomenal. Similar considerations seem to apply to all cases of macrophysical 
composition. Thus, Mereological Gap cannot be deeply opaque. 
 
Based on the above, purely on a priori considerations, Consciousness Gap is deeply 
opaque, while insofar as Mereological Gap can be called opaque, it must be regularly 
opaque.  
 
Regular Opacity: For any ground P and strong-groundee Q, the claim 
that P grounds Q exhibits a regularly opaque explanatory gap iff (i) P 
and Q are conceived under transparent concepts, and (ii) a priori 
reflection on Q reveals P’s essence. 
 
Regular Opacity is the negation of Deep Opacity. All the specifications I stated above 
about Deep Opacity—mutatis mutandis—apply to Regular Opacity. 
 
If Heavyweightism is true, explanatory gaps are everywhere. Thus, all grounding 
connections are opaque. However, as I argued, some explanatory gaps are 
categorically more opaque than others. These are the deeply opaque gaps. Here, the 
ground and the groundee have vastly different essences. The groundee does not 
contain the properties that define its ground. Thus, in deeply opaque gaps, there is 
little or no intelligible connection between ground and groundee. In contrast, other 
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grounding connections are regularly opaque. Here, despite the failure of a priori 
entailment, the ground and groundee still have many significant aspects of essence in 
common. The groundee contains all the properties that define its ground. Thus, 
regularly opaque gaps maintain a significant intelligible connection between ground 
and groundee.  
 
Consciousness Gap, as I have argued, is deeply opaque, while Mereological Gap is 
regularly opaque.  
 
4.4. P-2: Explanation 
 
By itself, the deep opacity of an explanatory gap does not translate into a difference of 
metaphysical significance. This brings us to P-2: Explanation. I will argue that if the 
ground functionalist cannot remove the mysteriousness of deep opacity, she must at 
least explain its presence.  
 
The first reason in support of P-2 is that deep opacity is more mysterious than regular 
opacity. In regularly opaque gaps, the groundee contains the properties that define the 
ground. Thus, the ground seems to do substantial work in metaphysically explaining 
the groundee. There appears to be explanatory work done by both the ground and the 
grounding principles. This is why the grounding of composites in physical grounds is 
unsurprising and does not seem like a cosmic accident. In contrast, in cases of deep 
opacity, the groundee does not contain the properties that define the ground. Thus, 
the ground appears to be doing little or no work in metaphysically explaining the 
groundee. Instead, most of the explanatory work appears to be done by the grounding 
principles alone. I believe this is why the grounding of consciousness in a physical 
ground is surprising and seems like a cosmic accident. 
 
The second reason in support of P-2 is that mysteriousness, by itself, asks for an 
explanation. Ground functionalism promises to alleviate mysteriousness. In Schaffer’s 
(forthcoming) own words: “a satisfying metaphysics should be explanatory.” Thus, 
since deep opacity is mysterious and Consciousness Gap is deeply opaque, the ground 
functionalist should explain its deep opacity.   
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The third reason in support of P-2 is that, on the heavyweight view, regular opacity 
seems to be the rule, while deep opacity seems to be the exception to the rule. 
Mereological Gap is regularly opaque and obtains everywhere, in all potential 
instances of composition. In contrast, Consciousness Gap is deeply opaque and only 
obtains in cases where there is higher-level consciousness. Thus, Consciousness Gap 
is an exception, and exceptions, in general, deserve an explanation.  
 
I anticipate that Schaffer might object to this third point. He might say that even if 
Consciousness Gap is deeply opaque, it is not the only deeply opaque explanatory gap. 
Schaffer (forthcoming) mentions potential explanatory gaps involving sets, value, and 
particle locations. The set gap is a putative explanatory gap between the members of 
sets (as grounds) and sets (as groundees). The value gap is a putative explanatory gap 
between the physical grounds of value and the value facts (as groundees). Finally, the 
particle gap assumes Albert’s (1996) reading of Bohmian quantum theory. This 
putative explanatory gap involves the one fundamental particle in 3N-dimensional 
configuration space (the “world-particle,” in Albert’s terminology) as a ground. In the 
roles of groundees, this gap involves the locations of the many derivative particles in 
ordinary 3-dimensional space. I go over these cases one by one. 
 
The set gap does not appear to be deeply opaque. {Socrates} (as a groundee), a priori, 
clearly reveals the essence of its ground Socrates. The same seems true for other sets 
and their members. By definition, sets are collections of such-and-such elements. If 
so, sets a priori reveal the conditions that set elements must fulfill to belong to the set. 
Thus, the set gap cannot be deeply opaque.  
 
The value gap might be deeply opaque. The moral property goodness (as a groundee) 
does not seem to a priori reveal the essence of its physical ground. This might simply 
be because moral concepts are not transparent. Alternatively, it might be because the 
underlying grounding claim is false. The value gap posits that moral properties are 
strong-groundees. Historically, this has been the position of moral realists who oppose 
naturalism. If so, moral realists could argue against ground functionalism based on 
the deep opacity of the value gap in a way analogous to how I use Consciousness Gap 
to argue against it. If so, everything I say here about consciousness—mutatis 
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mutandis—likewise applies to the case of value. Thus, it seems, recourse to the value 
gap does not decisively help the ground functionalist. 
 
The particle gap does not appear to be deeply opaque. Derivative particles (as 
groundees) seem to a priori reveal the essence of their ground, the world-particle. After 
all, the world-particle and the many derivative particles are both essentially particles. 
They belong to the same kind and have all the same essential properties. They are both 
what Maudlin (2007) would call “local beables”: physical entities that exist 
somewhere, at some definite location in space-time. All of this indicates that the 
particle gap cannot be deeply opaque. 
 
Proponents of Bohmian quantum theory such as Maudlin prefer this theory over other 
quantum theories precisely because it offers a sense of intelligibility between 
fundamental ontology and macroscopic reality. Quantum realists who are sympathetic 
towards Heavyweightism could argue against some quantum theories based on deep 
opacity worries.29 Namely, if a quantum theory posits an ontology with deeply opaque 
explanatory gaps towards the macrophysical, this is to be taken as evidence against 
that theory. Thus, as in the case of value, resorting to quantum theory at best provides 
a shaky ground for the ground functionalist.30  
 
4.5. Once More unto the Breach 
 
This ends my defense of the deep opacity argument. I now turn to outline the 
consequences of the deep opacity argument for ground functionalism and anti-
physicalism in general.   
 
First, the deep opacity argument does not refute ground functionalism. It only puts 
explanatory pressure upon it. It demands that the ground functionalist explains the 
deep opacity of Consciousness Gap.  
 
 
29 For example, the proposal of some proponents of Everettian or GRW quantum theory that 
fundamental reality is a 3N-dimensional quantum state. 
30 There is a lot more to be said about potential explanatory gaps between the quantum and the 
macrophysical scale. For a discussion, see Ney and Albert (2013). 
30 
The ground functionalist could explain the deep opacity of Consciousness Gap by 
appealing to the nature of phenomenal concepts. Doing so amounts to taking the path 
of the phenomenal concepts strategy (PCS) physicalist. PCS physicalists typically think 
that Consciousness Gap obtains because phenomenal concepts are not transparent.31 
In their view, consciousness is physical, yet it appears mysterious due to phenomenal 
concepts’ lack of transparency.  
 
Rejecting the transparency of phenomenal concepts offers a way out for the ground 
functionalist. However, it also comes at a price. The price is a return to the old (pre-
Mereological Gap) debate about phenomenal concepts. Whatever the solution to the 
phenomenal concepts debate may be, the deep opacity argument forces the ground 
functionalist to discuss the special features of phenomenal concepts. Thus, in effect, to 
resolve the problem, the ground functionalist must acknowledge that Consciousness 
Gap is special. 
 
Second, the deep opacity argument opens an avenue for anti-physicalists to argue 
against ground functionalism based on Consciousness Gap. Anti-physicalists 
sympathetic towards Heavyweightism can use the deep opacity argument to argue for 
Heavyweight Anti-Physicalism. One such view is heavyweight panpsychism (the 
conjunction of panpsychism and Heavyweight Anti-Physicalism). 
 
Panpsychism is roughly the thesis that all fundamental physical entities are 
intrinsically conscious. Goff (2017) defends panpsychism, while Chalmers (1996) is 
greatly sympathetic towards it. Panpsychism’s major selling point is its compatibility 
with the causal closure of the physical and all the other scientific evidence that 
physicalism is compatible with. Thus, if panpsychists are right about this, both ground 
functionalism and panpsychism fit the empirical data equally well.  
 
Heavyweight panpsychists could argue that human experiences (as groundees) a priori 
reveal the essences of their experiential grounds. Both human experiences and the 
putative fundamental experiences are essentially experiences. They belong to the 
same kind. From here, panpsychists could argue that each human experience contains 
 
31 See Goff (2017, pp. 93–95). 
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the phenomenal properties that define its ground’s essence. If so, heavyweight 
panpsychism could offer an intelligible connection between fundamental reality and 
human consciousness that ground functionalism lacks.32   
 
I do not claim heavyweight panpsychism can definitely remove Consciousness Gap’s 
deep opacity. I only claim it has a better chance at this than ground functionalism. 
Heavyweight panpsychism preserves Mereological Gap’s regular opacity (and the 
regular opacity of ground functionalism’s other regularly opaque explanatory gaps). 
Thus, if heavyweight panpsychism fits the empirical data equally well as ground 
functionalism yet explains more, it should be preferred over ground functionalism. If 
so, heavyweight panpsychism is one good way to endorse Heavyweight Anti-
Physicalism, based on the specialness of Consciousness Gap. 
 
In summary: I showed that even if explanatory gaps are everywhere, Consciousness 
Gap stands out as deeply opaque. The mysteriousness of Consciousness Gap demands 
an explanation. Whether we seek to defend ground functionalism or argue for 
Heavyweight Anti-Physicalism, Consciousness Gap regains its dialectical 
significance. There is a lot more to be said about the details. Nevertheless, whether the 
reader agrees with the physicalist or the anti-physicalist, the message of this section is 








32 Another advantage of heavyweight panpsychism is that it seems to avoid the combination problem, 
which is roughly the problem of how the fundamental consciousness gives rise to derivative 
consciousness. If heavyweight panpsychism is true, mental combination would be explained via the 




I defined two metaphysical positions that anti-physicalists can take in response to 
Schaffer’s Mereological Gap challenge. One, they can reject Mereological Gap and 
embrace Lightweight Anti-Physicalism. Two, they can accept Mereological Gap and 
embrace Heavyweight Anti-Physicalism. I argued that in either case, they could be 
anti-physicalists in virtue of Consciousness Gap. The consciousness explanatory gap 
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